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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE SAILS THE HIGH SEAS:
HAVE THE RECOVERY RIGHTS OF CARGO
OWNERS BEEN JEOPARDIZED?
Breaking with a century old precedent, the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.' unanimously
announced that the longstanding rule of divided damages2 in mutual
fault maritime collisions is to be replaced by a rule of proportional fault.3
The old rule required that in cases of collisions between vessels 4 the
1. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
2. The origins of the divided damages rule are shrouded in the fog of antiquity. The
rule emerged in British admiralty law in the early nineteenth century. SeeUnited States v.
Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397,401-02 n.3 (1975). In the Woodrop-Sims, 2 Dods.
83, 165 Eng. Rep. 1422 (1815), Lord Stowell stated in dictum that an equal division of
damages was appropriate where both vessels were at fault. 165 Eng. Rep. at 1423. Nine
years later, this dictum became the law of England when the House of Lords held that in a
mutual fault collision, damages must be divided equally. Hay v. LeNeve, 2 Shaw Sc. Ap.
Cas. 395 (1824).
In Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854), the rule of divided
damages was established in United States admiralty law. When the case came before the
Supreme Court in 1854, the divided damages rule was well established in the English
courts. Recognizing that the English law had become entrenched as the majority view in.
the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted the rule of equal
division of damages. Id. at 177.
However, England has since abandoned the rule, and now apportions damages on the
basis of fault whenever possible. Maritime Conventions Act, I & 2 Geo. 5, c. 57, § I, at 454
(1911). For an excellent discussion of the historical development of the divided damages
rule in England, see 4 BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS, THE LAW OF COLLISIONS AT SEA 108-12
(I lth ed. 1961); in the United States, see Sprague, Divided Damages, 6 N.Y.U.L. REV. 15
(1928); Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases,
45 CALIF. L. REV. 304 (1957).
3. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart stated:
We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause
property damage in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is
to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of
their fault, and that liability for such damages is to be allocated equally only
when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure
the comparative degree of their fault.
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
There is a significant distinction between the proportional fault rule appearing in the
Collision Convention and the rule adopted by the Supreme Court. While the Collision
Convention applies only to maritime collisions, the United States law governs both
maritime collisions and strandings.
4. To simplify discussion, it is assumed that a maritime collision involves two
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negligent parties shared equally in liability for property damage, regard-
less of degrees of fault.5 The proportional rule, on the other hand,
allocates liability for damage in accordance with each vessel's degree of
fault. The adoption of the proportional rule brings United States
admiralty law into line with a similar provision of the Brussels Liability
Collision Convention of 1910 (Collision Convention), 6 which is fol-
lowed by the principal maritime nations of the world. 7
vessels, both of which are mutually at fault, and cargo aboard one or both of the vessels is
lost or damaged.
It should be noted that in addition to mutual fault collisions, the divided damages rule
applied when the collision or grounding was caused by the contributing fault of a nonvessel
party. Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1874) (barge struck a pier because of the
joint negligence of the barge and the pier owner).
5. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
6. International Convention for the Purpose of Establishing Uniformity in Certain
Rules Regarding Collisions, opened for signature September 23, 1910, 4 Am. J. INT'L L.
121 (1910) [hereinafter cited as Collision Convention].
Article 4, paragraph I of the Collision Convention provides:
If both are at fault, the responsibility of each of the vessels shall be in proportion
to the gravity of the faults respectively committed; however, if, according to the
circumstances, the proportion cannot be established or if the faults appear to be
equal, the responsibility shall be shared equally.
Id. at 122.
The Collision Convention was signed by representatives of 24 principal maritime
nations, including the United States. Letter from Secretary of State to Senator Pittman
(June 13, 1939), reprinted in [1939] A.M.C. 1068-069. For a brief discussion of the
historical background of the Collision Convention, see 6 KNAUTH'S, BENEDICT ON ADMI.
RALTY 38 (7th ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as BENEDICTON ADMIRALTY]. The purpose of the
Convention was to establish internationally recognized maritime principles which would
govern the shipowners' rights and liabilities upon collision in reference to one another as
well as to the cargo owner. Letter from Secretary of State to Senator Pittman, supra.
However, because of the outbreak of World War I and vigorous opposition from those
with cargo interests, the Collision Convention was not submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent until 1937. Hearings on S. 555, S. 556 Before the Subcomm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1 st Sess.,
136 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Hearings].
After receiving a favorable report from the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Rela-
tions, the Collision Convention was sent to the full Foreign Relations Committee where it
was endorsed and recommended for Senate ratification. 1963 Hearings, supra at 136.
However, the 76th Congress never took action on the Foreign Relations Committee's
request for advice and consent. Id. at 132. In 1947, the Collision Convention was among
several unratified treaties removed from the Senate calendar by President Truman. 16
Dep't State Bull. 726 (1947).
In 1962, hearings were held before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Commerce. The hearings were designed to implement
adoption of the Collision Convention through domestic legislation. Although the commit-
tee reported favorably on the legislation and recommended its passage, the 87th Congress
adjourned without taking action. In 1963, similar legislation was introduced, hearings were
held, but it died in committee. Note, Shipowners 'Limited Liability, 3 COLUM. Soc. & L.J.
105, 110 (1967).
7. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAWOF ADMIRALTY 529 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
Vol. 7
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1977], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss1/3
CARGO OWNER RECOVERY RIGHTS
Although United States law now conforms to the Collision Con-
vention provisions on the apportionment of liability for vessel damage
between negligent parties involved in a collision, it continues to differ
significantly with respect to the recovery rights of cargo owners whose
goods are damaged or destroyed. Under article 4, paragraph 2 (Conven-
tion rule)8 of the Collision Convention, the cargo owner is entitled to
recover damages from the negligent shipowners only in proportion to
their respective degrees of fault. 9 There is no joint and several liability.
Traditionally, United States law has held those in control of
negligent vessels jointly and severally liable such that a cargo owner
may elect to sue either vessel for the entire amount of his damages.'
0
Reliable Transfer does not alter this rule.
The conflict between these two rules for distributing cargo damage
liability is significant in those cases in which both vessels are con-
tributorily at fault for the collision, but where the carrying vessel",
enjoys immunity from responsibility for its own cargo.' 2 In such cases,
the Convention rule permits the cargo owner to recover from the
non-carrying vessel' 3 Only to the extent that the non-carrying vessel
contributed to the collision. Thus, the cargo owner always stands to lose
The following countries have ratified or adhered to the Collision Convention:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Danzig, Denmark, Egypt,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Newfoundland, New Zealand, Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, U.S.S.R., Sweden, Switzerland, Tur-
key, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 6, at 38-39.
8. Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Collision Convention [hereinafter cited as Conven-
tion rule] provides:
Injuries caused to the vessels, to their cargo, or to the personal effects or other
property of the crew, passengers, or other persons on board, shall be borne by
the vessels at fault in the aforesaid proportion [article 4, paragraph 1], without
any joint responsibility on the part of third parties.
Collision Convention, supra note 6, at 122.
9. Hearings on S. 2313, S. 2314 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 87 Cong., 2d Sess., 36 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as 1962 Hearings]. See G. SUNDSTROM, FOREIGN SHIPS AND FOREIGN WATERS 94
(1971) [hereinafter cited as SUNOSTROM]. For application of this rule in England, see The
Umora, 12 Mar. L. Cas. (n.s.) 527 (1914); The Drumlanrig, II Mar. L. Cas. (n.s.) 451
(1910).
10. The Alabama and the Game-Cock, 92 U.S. 695 (1875); see also The Atlas, 93
U.S. 302 (1876). The common law rule of joint and several liability requires each negligent
party to assume full responsibility to the innocent party who has been injured. Generally,
the injured party chooses to sue the most solvent person rather than the person who did the
most wrong. The Milan, 167 Eng. Rep. 167, 170-71 (1861).
11. The carrying vessel is the ship on which the goods are being transported.
12. In certain instances, the provisions of the Harter Act exempt the shipowner from
liability for damage to cargo on board his vessel. See notes 21-23, infra, and accompanying
text.
13. The non-carrying vessel is the other ship involved in a collision.
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that portion of damages corresponding to the carrying vessel's percen-
tage of fault, which must be borne by the cargo owner or his underwrit-
er.' 4 United States law, however, would still allow the cargo owner to
recover in full against the non-carrying vessel irrespective of that
shipowner's percentage of fault,' 5 provided that the non-carrying vessel
is solvent and cannot limit its liability. 16
An inevitable result of these disparate approaches is forum shop-
ping. 17 Shipowners and cargo owners alike seek haven in a forum where
the law most advantageous to their interests will apply. Shipowners
attempting to avoid liability seek refuge in a state where the Convention
rule applies. The cargo owners, on the other hand, attempt to litigate in
United States courts to take advantage of their right to full recovery from
the non-carrying vessel. United States adoption of the Convention rule
would establish both uniformity of results in international maritime
disputes by reducing the incentive to forum shop, and uniformity in the
United States law of maritime collision liability distribution, regardless
of whether the interests at stake were those of the vessel owners or cargo
owners.
This comment will explore the potential impact of Reliable Trans-
fer on the liabilities of negligent shipowners to the owners of damaged
cargo. The historical development of United States law will first be
analyzed. This will include a brief discussion of a shipowner's statutory
right to limit his liability. The current international rules governing
collision liability will then be examined and a hypothetical example
given to illustrate the causes underlying transoceanic forum shopping.
Finally, reasons will be offered supporting the proposal that United
States maritime collision law be brought into harmony with that of the
international maritime community, thereby eliminating the incentive for
forum shopping, and relieving the vessel owners from the jeopardy of
being exposed to liability grossly disproportionate to their fault.
14. Note, The Difficult Quest for a Uniform Maritime Law: Failure of the Brussels
Conventions to Achieve International Agreement on Collision Liability, Liens, and Mort-
gages, 64 YALE L.J. 878, 882 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Maritime Law]. It is for
this reason that those with cargo interests have bitterly fought to prevent United States
ratification of the Collision Convention. 1962 Hearings, supra note 9, at 42.
15. The non-carrying vessel's percentage of fault appears meaningless since that
vessel is made the object of the entire claim for damage to the carrying vessel's cargo.
However, the non-carrying vessel's degree of fault becomes extremely significant when it
seeks contribution from the carrying vessel. See text accompanying note 76, infra.
16. When a cargo owner seeks full recovery against one of the vessels at fault, his
recovery is subject to that vessel owner's statutory right to limit liability. See notes 39-43,
55-56, infra, and accompanying text.
17. 1963 Hearings, supra note 6, at 132. See text accompanying notes 57-68, infra.
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I. PRESENT SITUATION
In the international maritime community, a shipowner has avail-
able to him two statutory defenses which may reduce the quantum of
recovery available to the owner of damaged cargo. First, carrying vessel
owners may be immune to all liability for damage resulting from
negligent navigation or management of the ship. Second, regardless of
whether a shipowner is permitted to invoke this defense, he may be
entitled to establish a "limitation fund" which sets an absolute max-
imum to his possible liability and from which all claims must be
satisfied. If the shipowner is permitted to limit his liability, the cargo
owner's recovery may be substantially diminished. The limitation of
liability concept applies to the owners of both carrying and non-carrying
vessels.
A. United States Law
Prior to 1893, shipowners were ordinarily held liable for any
damage to cargo aboard their vessel. I8 In a collision where both vessels
bore a degree of responsibility for the accident, the cargo owner was
entitled to recover half his damages from each vessel. 19 If, however, one
ship was unable to pay its share, the cargo owner was entitled to a
judgment against the other vessel for the full sum of his damages.
20
Thus, owners of cargo enjoyed a high degree of protection tor cargo loss
or damage arising from a collision.
Because of the burden that this exposure to liability imposed on
United States shipowners, they successfully lobbied for passage of the
Harter Act, adopted in 1893.21 This Act provided that the owner of a
18. See The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7 (1858), wherein the
Supreme Court stated:
Common carriers by water, like common carriers by land, in the absence of any
legislative provisions prescribing a different rule, are also, in general, insurers,
and liable in all events and for every loss or damage, however occasioned,
unless it happened by the act of God, or the public enemy, or by some other
cause of accident, without any fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, and
expressly excepted in the bill of lading.
Id. at 23.
19. The Alabama and the Game-Cock, 92 U.S. 695 (1875); see also The Atlas, 93
U.S. 302 (1876).
20. Id.; cf. The Milan, 167 Eng. Rpt. 167 (1861). Under the English rule of divided
damages, the owner of cargo could only recover one-half from each vessel irrespective of
one vessel's inability to pay its share, because the liability of each vessel was several, but
not joint.
21. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1974). The Harter Act was designed to solve the problem
resulting when shipowners of other maritime nations were permitted to contract away
liability for property damage by placing exculpatory clauses in bills of lading. GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 7, at 142. These clauses exempted the shipowners from their own
negligence. Although valid in England, The Xantho, 6 Mar. L. Cas. (n.s.) 8 (1886),
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carrying vessel who exercised due diligence in furnishing a seaworthy
ship, 22 would be exempt from liability for damage to cargo on board his
vessel resulting from negligent navigation or management of the ship. 
23
Following enactment of the Harter Act, two questions arose with
regard to a shipowner's liability for damage to cargo resulting from a
collision. First, since the owner of the carrying vessel in certain
instances was immune from direct liability for its cargo, would the
owner of cargo on board his vessel be entitled to a full recovery against
the non-carrying vessel? Secondly, if the owner of the non-carrying
vessel was required to pay 100 percent of the damages, did he have any
recourse against the carrying vessel to recover a portion of this amount?
The issues were resolved by The Chattahoochee.24 That case
involved a collision between an American steamship, Chattahoochee,
and a Canadian schooner, Golden Rule. As a result of the collision, the
Golden Rule, together with her cargo, became a total loss. The Golden
Rule exempted itself from liability for the cargo owner's loss by
invoking the Harter Act. 25 Under these facts the Supreme Court held that
the cargo owner could recover his full losses from the non-carrying
vessel. 26 Further, the Court permitted the non-carrying vessel to include
exculpatory clauses were against public policy and therefore void in the United States.
Liverpool and Great Western S.S. Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
Passage of the Harter Act resulted in a compromise between the cargo interests who
wanted the vessel to bear absolute responsibility for acts of negligence and the shipping
interests who sought almost complete exoneration from liability arising from its negli-
gence. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 142-43. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v.
S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11 (2d. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970).
This compromise appears in section 3 of the Harter Act which states:
If the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any
port in the United States of America shall exercise due diligence to make the
said vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and
supplied, neither the vessel, or her owner or owners' agent, or charterers shall
become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors
in navigation or in the management of said vessel ...
46 U.S.C. § 192 (1974) (emphasis added).
22. As stated by the Supreme Court, "[t]he test of seaworthiness is whether the
vessel is reasonably fit to carry the cargo which she has undertaken to transport." The
Silvia, 171 U.S. 462, 464 (1898).
23. 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1974).
24. 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
25. Although the Golden Rule was a foreign-flag vessel, the Supreme Court permit-
ted the owner to invoke the defense of error in navigation or management. Relying on the
language in section 3 of the Harter Act which states that this section applies to "any vessel
transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in the United States," 46 U.S.C.
§ 192 (1974), the Court stated: "we know of no reason why a foreign vessel like the Golden
Rule, engaged in carrying a cargo from a foreign port to Boston, is not entitled to the
benefit of this provision." The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540, 550 (1899).
26. "Since the negligence of the carrying vessel is not imputed to its cargo," and
since the Harter Act does not protect the non-carrying vessel, there is no obstacle barring
Vol. 7
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in its damages all payments made to the owner of the cargo. The
non-carrying vessel was then allowed through contribution 27 to recoup
one-half 28 this amount from the carrying vessel .29
The Chattahoochee resulted in a "curious anomaly." 30 When a
carrying vessel complied with the provisions of the Harter Act and was
entirely at fault, the owner of cargo was precluded from recovery against
that vessel.31 If, however, the carrying vessel were only partially at
fault, it could be found indirectly liable for at most half of any damage to
its own cargo, even though the Harter Act exempted it from such
liability. 32 Thus, under certain circumstances, it might be in the ship-
the owner of cargo from recovering in full from the non-carrying vessel as a joint
tort-feasor. Read, The Recovery Rights of Cargo in Marine Collisions Under the Major-
Minor Fault Doctrine, I I Loy. L. REV. 231, 232 (1963).
27. At common law, one of the two negligent tort-feasors who was compelled to pay
the innocent victim in full had no redress against the other wrongdoer. There was no right
of contribution from the other person. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 305 (4th ed. 1971).
In admiralty, the negligent shipowner is in a more favorable position than most
tort-feasors in that he may recover contribution from the joint tort-feasor. See Erie R.R.
Co. v. Erie & W. Trans. Co., 204 U.S. 220 (1907);The Ira M. Hedges, 218 U.S. 264 (1910).
However, under the rule of divided damages, the right to contribution applied only where
the other tort-feasor had paid more than one-half of the third party's damages. The
Juniata, 93 U.S. 337 (1876).
28. The method used to calculate damages resulting from a maritime collision under
the divided damages rule was exemplified in The Sapphire, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 51, 56 (1873)
wherein the Court stated:
It is undoubtedly the rule in admiralty that where both vessels are in fault the
sums representing the damage sustained by each must be added together and the
aggregate divided between the two. This is in effect deducting the lesser from
the greater and dividing the remainder. . . .If one in fault has sutained no
injury, it is liable for half the damages sustained by the other, though that other
was also in fault.
For example, if ship A sustains damages of $50,000 and ship B, $25,000, A is entitled to
recover one-half the difference, $12,500. See The North Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882). For a
thorough examination of the economic consequences resulting from an application of the
divided damages rule and the proportional fault rule, see Huger, The Proportional Damage
Rule in Collisions at Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Huger].
29. The Court held that the non-carrying vessel was entitled to contribution because
the Harter Act was not intended to increase the liabilities as between the negligent vessels.
The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 549, 555 (1899). Even though a vessel sustains cargo
damages, the total damages suffered by each vessel must be shared equally. Id. See also
The North Star, 106 U.S. 17, 22 (1882).
30. A. KNAUTH, THE AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 211 (4th ed. 1953)
[hereinafter cited as KNAUTH]. It has been argued that an anomaly does not exist since the
Harter Act was designed to govern only the relationship between the cargo owner and the
carrying vessel. The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459, 471 (18%).. Consequently, because the
liability of the carrying vessel to the non-carrying vessel is not affected by the Harter Act,
id., it has no application as between the negligent vessels in dividing collision damages. See
Green, The Harter Act, 16 HARV. L. REV. 157 (1903).
31. Waesche, Cargo's Rights in Collision Cases, 45 TUL. L. REV. 781, 786 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Waesche]. See 1962 Hearings, supra note 9, at 42.
32. SUNDSTROM, supra note 9, at 94-95.
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owner's interest to plead that it was solely at fault because if successful,
the shipowner would likely escape indirect liability to his own cargo. 33
During the 1930's, shipowners attempted to correct this inconsis-
tency by inserting a "Both-To-Blame Clause" in their bills of lading.34
This clause required the owner of cargo to indemnify the carrying vessel
for its losses arising from indirect liability. 35 The cargo owner, after
recovering in full from the non-carrying vessel, was obligated to pay
half of this recovery to the carrying vessel.36 However, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. 37 held such clauses
invalid, 38 thereby denying to shipowners any relief from the inconsis-
tencies of The Chattahoochee.
The immunity extended by the Harter Act permits a carrying vessel
owner, meeting certain criteria, to escape liability in part or in toto.
Independent of whether a shipowner is able to invoke this immunity in a
given circumstance, the Limitation Act of 185 13 permits any ship-
owner to establish a monetary fund representing an absolute maximum
to his possible liability. 4° This statutory provision, which is still the law
33. In OIY Finlayson-Forssa A/B v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 259 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 882 (1959), the court refused to allow a shipowner to take
advantage of this plea.
34. The ocean bill of lading as a commercial document serves three purposes: First,
it is a receipt for goods; second, it is a document of title; third, it represents a contract for
carriage of goods. This contract establishes the liability of the shipowner to the cargo
owner. W. POOR, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARTER PARTIES AND OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 134
(5th ed. 1968).
35. In United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952), the Court
stated: "[T]he very purpose of exacting this bill of lading stipulation is to enable one ship
to escape its equal share of [collision damages] by shifting a part of its burden to its cargo
owners." Id. at 242. See 1963 Hearings, supra note 6, at 34.
36. For a discussion of the mechanics of the "Both-To-Blame Clause", see GIL-
MORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 173-76.
37. 343 U.S. 236 (1952).
38. The Court stated that if the rule against allowing shipowners to "stipulate against
their own negligence" in bills of lading "is to be changed, the Congress, not the
shipowners, should change it." Id. at 242.
39. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Limitation Act]. For a thorough
discussion of the concept of limitation of liability, see GItMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at
818-957.
The underlying policy of the Act was expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, wherein he stated:
Legislation limiting shipowners liability was first enacted in 1851 to provide
assistance to American shipowners [by encouraging investment in American
vessels] and thereby place them in a favorable position in the competition for
world trade. . . . The legislation was designed to induce the heavy financial
commitments the shipping industry requires by mitigating the threat of a
multitude of suits and the hazards of vast, unlimited liability as a result of a
maritime disaster.
347 U.S. 409, 413-14 (1954).
40. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides in relevant part:
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today as regards liability to cargo,4 1 permits a shipowner to limit his
liability for cargo damage to the value of his interest in what remains of
the vessel and its freight after the accident.42 A shipowner can invoke
this defense if he can show that the losses have occurred without his
"privity and knowledge." 43
The Limitation Act is tantamount to exculpation of the shipowner
from liability to the cargo owners. This statutory right can have an even
more pronounced effect upon the interests of cargo owners than the
immunity extended by the Harter Act to the carrying vessel from cargo
claims. 44 For example, consider a collision in which the carrying vessel
were exonerated from liability to its own cargo, and the non-carrying
vessel became a total or near total loss. Further, assume that circum-
stances permit the non-carrying vessel to invoke the protection of the
Limitation Act. In such a case, the cargo owner's recovery would be
limited to any residual value of the non-carrying vessel.45 The present
limitation statute therefore subjects the cargo owners to the gamble of
the non-carrying vessel's survival. 46
The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for any
embezzlement, loss or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or
merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or
injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture,
done, occasioned, or occurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner
or owners, shall not. . . exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner
in such vessel, and her freight then pending.
46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1974) (emphasis added).
41. There have been no significant changes regarding the shipowner's liability to
cargo since the inception of the Limitation Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181, 182, 183(a) (1974). It
should be noted, however, that an important change has occurred with respect to personal
injury and loss of life claims. When the limitation fund is insufficient to pay personal
injury and death claimants, a fund of at least $60 for each ton of the ship's total tonnage
must be made available to settle such claims. 46 U.S.C. § 183(b)-(f) (1974)."
42. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1974). Although this section does not state that the value of
the shipowner's interest is determined after the collision, the Supreme Court has given it
this interpretation. Norwich and N.Y. Transp. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 126-27
(1881). This interest is not computed until the voyage is completed or when the final loss
has occurred. The City of Norwich, I 18 U.S. 468,490-93(1886). In addition, the insurance
carried by the vessel does not constitute part of the shipowner's interest in the vessel and
freight pending. The shipowner is not liable to cargo claimants for any amount that he
receives as insurance payments. The City of Norwich, supra at 504-05.
43. Privity means a negligent act attributable to the owner, whereas knowledge
indicates failure on the part of the owner to take proper precautions where he knows or
should have known that his inaction would result in loss or damage. Lord v. Goodall, 15 F.
Cas. 884, 887 (No. 8506) (C.C.D. Cal. 1877), aff'd, 102 U.S. 541 (1881).
44. See notes 21-23, supra, and accompanying text.
45. In a recent case, a United States federal district court approved a shipowner's
petition to limit his liability to the value of a $50 life boat, which was the only item salvaged
after the sinking of his vessel. In Re Barracuda Tanker Corp. (The Torrey Canyon case),
281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
46. Kloeckner Reederi und Kohlenhandel G.M.B.H. v. A/S Hakedal (The Western
Farmer case), 210 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1954).
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B. The International Rule,
In the last quarter of the 19th century, the need to harmonize the
divergent views of the maritime nations into a set of uniform interna-
tional rules regarding collision liability became evident. As a result, the
Comit6 Maritime International 47 was organized for the purpose of
achieving this goal. After several years of preliminary work, the Comit6
brought the representatives of the leading maritime nations together in
Brussels in 1910. Their effort culminated in the drafting of the Collision
Convention.
In contrast to the United States law under which negligent vessels
are jointly and severally liable for the cargo owner's loss, the Conven-
tion rule holds the ships severally liable. The owner of cargo is entitled
to recover in proportion to each ship's fault and cannot look to one vessel
for full recovery. Since the non-carrying vessel's liability is limited to its
proportional share of cargo damage, it has no recourse against the
carrying vessel. Contribution is thereby eliminated.48 Accordingly, the
Convention rule cures the anomaly of The Chattahoochee in which the
carrying vessel is held indirectly responsible for damage to its own
cargo, but is exempted from direct liability under the Harter Act.4 9
Application of the Convention rule has tremendous importance to
both shipowners and cargo owners in situations where the carrying
vessel can invoke the Hague Rules50 as a defense. These Rules repre-
sent, in effect, an international codification of the Harter Act provisions,
as they insulate the owner of the carrying vessel from liability for
damage to his cargo resulting from errors in navigation or manage-
47. The Comit6 Maritime International, which consisted of lawyers, shipowners and
underwriters from several countries, was created in 1896. KNAUTH, supra note 30, at
123-24; Huger, supra note 28, at 531.
48. 1962 Hearings, supra note 9, at 86. See also J. GRIFFIN, THE AMERICAN LAWOF
COLLISION 562 (1949).
49. In discussing the advantages of the Convention rule at the 1962 Hearings,
Charles S. Haight, chief advocate of the Collision Convention, stated:
The abolishment of the joint and several liability so far as cargo is concerned,
will make effective in all cases the provisions of the Harter Act. . . . It will
provide that where there is no direct liability of the carrying ship to his cargo,
there will be no indirect liability. . . . This rule makes fully effective the intent
of the Harter Act. . . as to the carrying ship, and imposes no undue burden on
the non-carrying ship.
1962 Hearings, supra note 9, at 86.
50. International Convention for the Unification of certain Rules relating to Bills of
Lading, done Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 (1931-32) [hereinafter cited as Hague
Rules]. The primary objective of the Hague Rules was to balance the competing interests
between the shipowners and cargo owners by "effectuat[ing] a standard and uniform set
of provisions for ocean bills of lading." Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong
Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970). See also
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 143.
Vol. 7
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ment. 51 When the Convention rule applies and the carrying vessel is
shielded from liability to its cargo by the Hague Rules, the cargo
owner's recovery against the non-carrying vessel is limited to that
vessel's percentage of fault. 52 If, however, the carrying vessel fails to
comply with the terms of the Hague Rules, the cargo owner will be
allowed to recover from the carrying vessel in proportion to that vessel's
percentage of fault.
53
Just as the United States allows for the limitation of a shipowner's
liability, 54 other maritime nations supplement their collision recovery
rules with limitation regulations. However, in contrast to the United
States system which fixes liability at thesalvage value of the vessel and
its cargo after the collision, 5 the procedure followed by other states
limits a shipowner's potential exposure to an amount based solely on the
vessel's gross tonnage. 56 No consideration is given either to the actual
value of the vessel or to its cargo.
C. Forum Shopping
The absence of international uniformity as regards a cargo owner's
right to recovery encourages international forum shopping. Both ship-
ping interests and cargo interests attempt to select a forum where the
51. Article 4, section I of the Hague Rules states in part:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising from or
resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the
part of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy and to secure that the ship is
properly manned, equipped, and supplied ...
Hague Rules, supra note 49, at 165.
Article 4, section 2 provides in part:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or
resulting from: (a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, marine, pilot, or the
servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship.
Id. at 167.
In 1936, the United States enacted the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C.
1300-15 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COGSA], which was an amended version of the Hague
Rules. While there are some minor alterations between the Hague Rules and COGSA, the
protection available to shipowners for errors in navigation or management remains
unchanged. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a) (1975).
52. A hypothetical illustrates the situation. Assume a collision in which ship A and
ship B were at fault 25 percent and 75 percent, respectively, and B's cargo sustains
$500,000 in damages. Ship B's cargo owner would recover only $125,000 (25 percent of
$500,000) from A. The cargo owner would have no right of recourse against B for the
remaining $375,000. See note 14, supra, and accompanying text.
53. 1962 Hearings, supra note 9, at 8.
54. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1974).
55. See note 42, supra.
56. SUNDSTROM, supra note 9, at 91-92. A limitation fund based on the tonnage of the
vessel was introduced by Great Britain in 1854, and "is now applied almost everywhere
except in the United States." Id.
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legal principles most favorable to their interests will apply. Unless the
non-carrying vessel is rendered valueless and the owner can limit his
liability, the cargo owner will seek to pursue his claims in United States
courts in order to take advantage of this right to full recovery. 57
Shipowners, on the other hand, ordinarily prefer a forum where the
Convention rule applies. 58 However, their ability to limit liability will
also influence their preference of forum.
The attractiveness of forum shopping for both shipowners and
cargo owners is illustrated by the following hypothetical. Assume a
collision in which vessel A were 25 percent at fault and vessel B were 75
percent at fault. As a result of the accident, the damage to A's vessel is
$500,000 and B's damage totals $1,500,000. The cargo on board each
vessel sustains the identical amount of damages, $500,000. Further,
assume the owners of both A and B are to be immune in all forums from
liability for damage to cargo on board their respective vessels by virtue
of their compliance with both the Harter Act and the Hague Rules. 59
Under the prevailing United States law, the cargo owners could
recover in full from the non-carrying vessel, provided that vessel were
solvent and could not limit its liability. A's cargo owner could therefore
recover $500,000 from B, and the owner of cargo on board B could
57. Whether American or foreign cargo interests are granted access to pursue their
claims in a United States court depends on issues involving conflicts of laws and forum
non conveniens. See SUNDSTROM, supra note 9, at 108-21. An American cargo owner can
usually litigate his claim in a United States court because of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, and thereby recover in full from the non-carrying vessel. However, should the
cargo interests be foreign, United States courts will generally apply foreign law or not
assume jurisdiction. See The Mandu, 102 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 715
(1940); The Eagle Point, 142 F. 453 (2d Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 201 U.S. 644 (1906). Both
cases involved collisions outside United States territorial waters between vessels flying
foreign flags; the cargo owners and their underwriters were denied the right of full
recovery from either vessel.
An exception to the rule that foreign cargo interests cannot litigate their claims in a
United States court occurred in Kloeckener Reederei und Kohlenhandel v. A/S Hakedal
(The Western Farmer case), 210 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1954). In that case, an American ship
collided with a Norwegian vessel in the English Channel. The negligent shipowners settled
in an English court. Thereafter, the owner of cargo on board the American ship, a German
corporation, sought to recover damages against the Norwegian shipowner in the United
States. Against this background, the court held that the owner of cargo on board the
American ship was not precluded from prosecuting his claim in a United States court
because it was determined to be the most convenient forum.
58. See Waesche, supra note 31, at 788.
59. In this hypothetical, ships A and B are classified as "carrying" vessels as well as
"non-carrying" vessels. Reference will be made to the ships as "carrying" vessels when
their negligence causes damage to their own cargo. The ships will be designated as
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recover $500,000 from A. The non-carrying vessel in turn could add the
payment made to the carrying vessel's cargo owner ($500,000) to its
own damages and then recoup from the carrying vessel according to that
vessel's percentage of fault. Therefore, since the damages total
$3,000,000, A would be responsible for $750,000 and B $2,250,000.
If the Convention rule applies, the amounts of recovery would
differ greatly. Neither A nor B would be liable to the owners of cargo on
board their vessels. The cargo owner could recover from the non-
carrying vessel, but only in proportion to that ship's fault (A's cargo
owner would recover $375,000, whereas B's cargo owner would
recover $125,000).60




A is liable for 25% of the total damages ($3,000,000) to
the vessels and cargo ............................................................... $ 750,000
B's Liability:
B is liable for 75% of the total damages ($3,000,000) to
the vessels and cargo ............................................................... $2,250,000
Cargo Owners' Account:
The owners of cargo on board A and B bear no liability
for damage to their cargo and are entitled to




A is liable for 25% of total vessel damages ($2,000,000)
and 25% of the damages to cargo on board
B ($500,000) .......................................................................... $ 625,000
B's Liability:
B is liable for 75% of total vessel damages ($2,000,000)
and 75% of the damages to cargo on board
B ($500,000) .......................................................................... $1,875,000
Cargo Owners' Account:
A's cargo:
Total loss resulting from collision ............................................... $ 500,000
A's cargo recovers 75% of its losses from B .................................. $ 375,000.
That portion of loss for which the cargo owner
cannot recover from either vessel ............................................... $ 125,000
B's cargo:
Total loss resulting from collision ............................................... $ 500,000
B's cargo recovers 25% of its losses from A .................................. $ 125,000
That portion of loss for which the cargo owner
cannot recover from either ship ................................................. $ 375,000
Total $3,000,000
For further analysis of the economic consequences resulting from an application of
both the United States law and the Convention rule where only one vessel sustains cargo
damage in a mutual fault collision, see Healy & Koster, Reliable Transfer Co. v. United
States: Proportional Fault Rule, 7 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 293, 299, 300 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Healy & Koster).
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The results of the hypothetical suggest that the owners of cargo
would attempt to bring suit in a United States court in order to maximize
the possibility of recovery, while the shipowners would seek a forum
outside the United States in order to minimize their liability.
The lack of an internationally accepted limitation of liability
system creates an added element inducing both shipowners and cargo
owners to forum shop. The addition of two factors to the above
hypothetical will help illustrate this point. Suppose that ship A and ship
B could limit their liability, each owner being "without privity or
knowledge" 61 of the act causing the loss. Further, ship A and her cargo
become a total loss, whereas ship B's value is not substantially
impaired.
Because of vessel B's immunity, the owner of cargo on board B
would have to look to vessel A for recovery. However, if A has
complied with the criteria for liability limitation, then under United
States law, the owner of B's cargo would be limited in his damage
recovery to the residual value of A and her cargo. If vessel A and her
freight were completely destroyed, B's cargo owner would be blocked
from all recovery, 62 a circumstance plainly inducive to ship A's owner
seeking a United States court.63 Conversely, the owner of ship B would
be required to establish a limitation fund for the owner of cargo aboard
A, regardless of forum, since a substantial value of his vessel would
have been retained. In determining which forum would result in the
greatest reduction of his exposure to the claims brought by A's cargo
owner, B's owner would weigh the value of B and any salvaged freight
against the amount derived from the application of the tonnage for-
mula 64 to ship B's total displacement.65
The shipowner's right to limit liability is an important factor to the
cargo owner. This issue must be carefully considered by him before
choosing a forum. Since the value of vessel B were not seriously
diminished, A's cargo owner would press his claim in the United States
and recover most of his damages. Ship B's cargo owner would be in
quite a different position, however. He would have to seek a forum
61. See note 43, supra.
62. There would be no limitation fund available to satisfy B's cargo owner, and
recovery therefore would be denied even though ship B stayed afloat. SUNDSTROM, supra
note 9, at 95-96.
63. A shipowner who is entitled to limit his liability will attempt deliberately to
"igtiatejin a United States court "only if the ship becomes a total or nearly total loss." Id. at
101.
64. See note 56 supra, and accompanying text.
65. See note 109, infra.
Vol. 7
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requiring a limitation fund based on the tonnage of the vessel in order to
be assured at least a partial recovery.
66
The foregoing discussion dramatizes the unsatisfactory results and
economic hardships that arise from disparity of outcome in different
forums. In addition, it serves to point up why forum shopping is
dependent on so many different factors. 67 One writer has aptly sum-
marized the situation as follows:
[The] striking difference between the law of the United States
and the law of other shipping nations has sometimes led
shipowners to adopt extraordinary precautions to avoid being
sued in the United States, and has also given rise to some
remarkable efforts by cargo [owners] to maintain suits in the
United States in order to gain the advantage of the American
rule. 6A
II. THE EFFECT OF RELIABLE TRANSFER
The controversy in Reliable Transfer arose when a coastal tanker
became lost in waters outside New York harbor and ran aground on a
sandbar. 69 The stranding of the vessel caused damages in excess of
$100,000. There was no damage to cargo. The district court found that
66. See Uniform Maritime Law, supra note 14, at 891 n.71.
67. The complexities that can arise when two negligent vessels collide on the high
seas and cargo is damaged is exemplified in Petition of Bloomfield Steamship Co., 422 F.2d
728 (2d Cir. 1970). In that case, a United States ship and a Norwegian flag vessel collided
outside the port of Le Havre, France. The Norwegian vessel sank shortly after the
collision, resulting in the total loss of that vessel and all her cargo. The owner of the
Norwegian ship brought suit against the United States vessel in England and tried to take
advantage of the proportional fault rule. The owners of damaged cargo filed claims in the
United States. Both shipowners filed petitions in a United States court to limit their
liability. In addition, the French government brought suit in their courts for wreckage
removal costs. Addressing itself to the labyrinth of problems created by the lack of
uniformity in international maritime collision law, the Court stated:
That interested parties here have engaged in extensive far-flung litigation is not
surprising. The owners of ships moving in international trade and colliding in
international waters may well expect to be involved in legal proceedings in more
than one country. Forum shopping in this context is not a term of opprobrium
but a way of life and each party seeks what appears to be the best legal haven.
Id. at 736.
68. KNAUTH, supra note 30, at 211-12.
69. On the night of December 23, 1968, the coastal tanker Mary A. Whalen, owned
by Reliable Transfer Co., embarked for Island Park, New York. As the Whalen was
proceeding across Rockaway Inlet in heavy seas, the captain noticed that the breakwater
light maintained by the United States Coast Guard was not operating. In spite of this, the
captain attempted to pass a barge traveling ahead of his vessel. When this proved
impossible, the captain made a 180 degree turn, passed behind the barge and headed on an
easterly course towards what he thought was the open sea. Moments after completing this
maneuver, however, the breakwater came into view and to avoid colliding with the rocks,
he ran the Whalen aground.
15
Yasgoor: Comparative Negligence Sails the High Seas: Have the Recovery Rig
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
the Coast Guard's failure to maintain a breakwater light contributed 25
percent to the grounding. The remaining 75 percent of fault was
attributed to the captain's negligence in failing to take proper precau-
tions to determine his position. However, in accordance with the United
States rule of divided damages, the government was held liable for 50
percent of the vessel's damages. 70 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed7' but recognized that a "division of damages in proportion to
the degree of fault may be more equitable' '72 than dividing the damages
equally. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 73 to reconsider the
divided damages rule. 74 Recognizing that every other major maritime
country adheres to the proportional fault rule and, moreover, that it
provides the most equitable remedy, the Court unanimously adopted
this doctrine.
United States adoption of the proportional fault rule75 significantly
unifies international maritime collision law as regards apportionment of
damages between negligent vessels involved in a collision. However,
since Reliable Transfer did not involve damage to cargo, it seems to
have little impact on the liability of shipowners to the owners of
damaged cargo.
It appears that the owner of cargo will still be entitled to a full
recovery against the non-carrying vessel. However, the non-carrying
vessel will no longer recoup an arbitrary 50 percent from the carrying
vessel for payment made to the carrying vessel's cargo owner. Rather,
the non-carrying vessel will receive contribution in proportion to the
carrying vessel owner's fault. 76 Therefore, Reliable Transfer does not
affect the inconsistencies created by The Chattahoochee. The question
that .remains is whether the courts or Congress will use Reliable
Transfer as a springboard to complete the process of bringing United
States admiralty law into conformity with the world maritime commu-
nity regarding the rights of cargo owners to recover against the negligent
vessel owners.
70. The memorandum and order of the District Court is unreported. Brief for
Petitioner at I, United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
71. 497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1974).
72. Id. at 1038.
73. 419 U.S. 1018 (1974).
74. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). In its decision
the Court stated:
[W]e are called upon to decide whether this country's admiralty rule of divided
damages should be replaced by a rule requiring when possible, the allocation of
liability for damages in proportion to the relative fault of each party.
Id. at 398.
75. See note 3, supra.
76. Healy & Koster, supra note 60, at 298. See Brief for Petitioner at 33, United
States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
Vol. 7
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III. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Apportionment of Damages
1. Congressional Action. Implementation of the Convention rule
through domestic legislation is one means by which the United States
can effectuate harmony in international collision law. Although the
Senate has failed to ratify the Convention rule on two previous occa-
sions,7 7 Reliable Transfer now provides Congress with the impetus
necessary to finish the job initiated by the Supreme Court.
For many years the United States shipowners have vigorously
urged adoption of the Collision Convention and particularly the Con-
vention rule. 78 They contend that the Convention rule would establish
greater predictability and uniformity of results, thus eliminating the
most important element inducing forum shopping. 79 It is further argued
by the shipowners that this uniformity would create better worldwide
trade conditions, and thereby stimulate international commerce.
80
In addition to worldwide uniformity in maritime collision laws,
shipowners favor the Convention rule because it would eliminate the
windfall profit that cargo underwriters currently enjoy under United
States law.81 Insurance premiums for cargo presuppose the application
of the internationally accepted Convention rule. 82 The cargo owners are
charged the same premiums whether any loss of their goods is litigated
in a United States forum or in a foreign court. 83 Thus, the cargo
underwriter receives premiums insuring against losses determined un-
der the Convention rule which prohibits full recovery against the
non-carrying vessel." Yet in the United States, the underwriter has the
77. See note 6, supra. To date, Congress has no plans involving the ratification of the
Collision Convention or the enactment of domestic legislation giving full effect to the
Convention rule. Letter from Robert Blackwell, Assistant Secretary for Maritime Affairs,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce (Nov. 12, 1975) [copy on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
78. Waesche, supra note 31, at 786.
79. Letter from Secretary of State to President Roosevelt (April 27, 1937), reprinted
in Hearings before Senate Subcomm. on Rules to Govern the Liability of Vessels when
Collisions Occur Between Them of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess., 5-6 (1939) [hereinafter cited as 1939 Hearings].
As stated by Leavenworth Colby of the Department of Justice: "Uniformity will
dispel uncertainties as to the rights and liabilities of litigants, decrease their tendency to
shop for the most favorable country in which to sue, and promote the just and prompt
resolution of maritime controversies." 1963 Hearings, supra note 6, at 12.
80. 1939 Hearings, supra note 79 at 191-92. See 1963 Hearings, supra note 6, at 12.
81. 1962 Hearings, supra note 9, at 240 (statement of Terrence Burke).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 40 (remarks of Arthur M. Boal).
84. Id. at 240.
17
Yasgoor: Comparative Negligence Sails the High Seas: Have the Recovery Rig
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
advantage of recovering in full, and thereby obtains additional profit
which is denied him in every other major maritime state.85
One major obstacle to congressional adoption of the Convention
rule has been the strenuous opposition raised by cargo owners and their
underwriters. They claim that adherence to this rule would result in
exorbitant increases in their insurance rates since they would be denied
full recovery against the non-carrying vessel.8 6 It is argued by cargo
owners that their insurance rates are based on the underwriter's recovery
record. In cases where the carrying vessel has complied with the
provisions of the Harter Act, implementation of the Convention rule
would significantly reduce cargo recoveries.87 Cargo owners contend,
therefore, that their insurance premiums would increase in order to
compensate the underwriter for his losses. 88 To counter this argument, it
has been shown that cargo insurance rates set and governed by a
worldwide market have not increased in countries that have ratified or
adhered to the Convention rule. 89 It would appear, therefore, that United
States adoption of the Convention rule would have little, if any, effect
on cargo insurance premiums since the premiums charged by cargo
underwriters already take into account application of the Convention
rule 
90
85. Id. at 40, 42.
86. Id. at 42.
87. See Huger, supra note 28, at 552.
88. Leonard J. Matteson, a past president of the Maritime Law Association Commit-
tee on Collision Liability, has stated:
[I]t is impossible to pinpoint exactly what happens to the insurance premiums as
a result of the changes in the law. . . . But this much is true, that cargo
recoveries are part of the loss record and anything that serves to reduce the
recoveries serves to worsen the loss record and consequently in the long run the
premiums have got to go up . . . because the underwriters can't afford to do
business at a loss.
1963 Hearings, supra note 6, at 123.
89. 1939Hearings, supra note 79, at 6. The Secretary of State indicated he had been
advised that maritime countries adopting the Collision Convention did not experience an
increase in the premiums charged by cargo underwriters. See 1962 Hearings, supra note 9,
at 40, 42.
Statistics released in a recent governmental study on cargo liability further support
the view that cargo insurance premiums will probably remain unaffected by the United
States adhering to the Convention rule. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, CARGO LIABILITY
STUDY: FINAL REPORT 68-86 (1975). The findings revealed that when costs associated with
cargo loss and damage for shipowners and cargo owners are combined, the total costs
related to export goods amounts to only one-quarter of one percent of the goods value. Id.
at 86. The total costs of import goods are equivalent to approximately one-half of one
percent of the goods value. Id. Because of these relatively small percentages of loss and
damage costs, it appears that the Convention rule would have a minimal effect on
the marine insurance market.
90. See text accompanying notes 82-83, supra. However, until there has been some
underwriting experience under the Convention rule, it is difficult to project the extent to
which this rule would affect either cargo or shipowner's liability insurance. Letter from
Vol. 7
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2. Court Action. The judicial inauguration of comparative negli-
gence in mutual fault collisions, and the heavy emphasis placed
upon assessing liability between the negligent shipowners in direct
proportion to fault, strongly suggest that the United States is ripe for an
overhaul of its treatment of cargo owners recovery rights as well. The
Court in Reliable Transfer appeared willing to take on the responsibility
of extending the proportional fault rule to include cargo claims when it
stated that "the Judiciary has traditionally taken the lead in formulating
flexible and fair remedies in law maritime, and 'Congress has largely
left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of
admiralty law.' -9 Had damage to cargo been an issue in Reliable
Transfer, it would not have been inconsistent for the Court to embrace
fully the policy of the Convention rule holding the vessel owners
severally but not jointly liable. Unless Congress acts, it must remain for
the courts, acting in a situation similar to that presented in Reliable
Transfer but also involving cargo damage, to continue to change the
ways of the waves.
92
3. Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea. A recent
development, if brought to completion, may effectively neutralize the
opposition of the cargo owners to adoption of the Convention rule. In
February, 1975, after four years of painstaking effort, a final text of a
Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea93 was adopted by the
Mr. Walter Maloney, senior partner at Bigham, Englar, Jones & Houston (Nov. 25,
1975) [copy on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.]. It is evident that adoption of the
Convention rule would reduce the quantum of recovery by cargo interests against the
non-carrying vessel. In the same respect, the underwriter providing liability insurance for
the shipowner would have partially reduced exposure. There can be no assurance,
however,"that the increased cost of cargo insurance, resulting from the convention,
would be matched by a decrease in the cost of the shipowner's liability coverage." Id.
It is important to note that insurance premiums did not increase when the "Both-To-
Blame Clause" was placed in United States bills of lading. See notes, 35-38, supra, and
accompanying text. That clause had the same effect as the Convention rule. It prohibited
indirect recovery by the owner of cargo against the carrying vessel. 1962 Hearings, supra
note 9, at 241.
91. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975), quoting
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963). See also Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 405 n.17 (1970) (the Court recognized an action under general
maritime law for death caused by a violation of maritime duties.
92. At least one court has held that the proportional fault rule announced in Reliable
Transfer "has no application to an action between innocent cargo and one of the vessels
involved in a collision." Mitsubishi International Corp. et al. v. Malaysia Overseas Lines,
Ltd. (Oriental Hero), No. 71 Civ. 4606 (S. D.N.Y., motion for reargument denied, June 22,
1976). See [1976] A.M.C. 1287, 1306. It is unlikely that the court's ruling will be
appealed because of favorable progress in settlement negotiations. Interview with David
C. Wood, Counsel for Malaysia Overseas Lines, Ltd. (Dec. 23, 1976).
93. Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 91195,
Annex (1975) [hereinafter cited as the Draft Convention]. At its ninth session, concluded
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Working Group on Merchant Shipping Legislation of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL).9 The Draft
Convention was designed to replace the existing Hague Rules by
establishing new guidelines for liability arising from cargo loss or
damage. 95 The importance of the Draft Convention is that it eliminates
the negligent navigation or management defense that the shipowners
currently enjoy under the Hague Rules. 96 The abolition of this defense is
strongly advocated by the United States.
97
Approval of a Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea
concluded by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries at the United Nations
and subsequent international acceptance could provide the impetus
needed for United States adoption of the Convention rule. Because the
owner of the carrying vessel would no longer be shielded from liability
for damage to cargo aboard his own vessel, it appears that the most
equitable remedy for apportionment of damages between shipowners
and cargo owners is to apply the Convention rule. The owners of cargo
still would be entitled to recover their full damages by receiving
in May 1976, UNCITRAL recommended "that the General Assembly should convene an
international conference of plenipotentiaries as early as practicable to conclude, on the
basis of the [D]raft Convention approved by the Commission, a Convention on the
Carriage of Goods by Sea." U.N. Doc. AICN. 9/1 x (1976). For a summary of work done at
the ninth session, see Report of the Working Group on the work of its ninth session, U.N.
Doc. A/CN. 31/17, Annex (1976).
94. For a discussion of the historical background of the Draft Convention, see
Kimball, Shipowner's Liability and the ProposedRevision of the Hague Rules, 7 J. MAR. L.
& COMM. 217, 232-35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kimball].
95. See Report of the Working Group on the work of its seventh session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN. 9/96 (1974).
96. Article 5 of the proposed Draft Convention provides in pertinent part:
I. The carrier shall be liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the
goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss,
damage or delay took place while the goods were in his charge as defined in
article 4, unless the carrier proves that he, his servants and agents took all
measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its
consequences.
7. Where fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants, or agents,
combines with another cause to produce loss, damage or delay in delivery the
carrier shall be liable only to the extent that the loss, damage or delay in delivery
is attributable to such fault or neglect, provided that the carrier proves the
amount of loss, damage or delay in delivery not attributable thereto.
31 U.N. GGAR, Supp. 17, at 76, 82, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976).
Before adopting article 5, paragraph 7, the Committee considered a proposal
submitted by the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to add a paragraph to article 5 that
would retain the shipowner's defense for negligent navigation. It is interesting to note that
the defense for negligent management of a ship was not included. After considerable
deliberation, the proposal was rejected. For an account of the arguments made against and
in support of this proposal, see id. at 82-83.
97. Sweeney, The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods By Sea (Part
1), 7 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 69, 116 (1975).
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payments from each ship in proportion to their respective degrees of
fault, unless one or more of the shipowners could limit their liability.
Further, the non-carrying vessel would no longer be subjected to 100
percent liability for damage to the cargo aboard the carrying vessel.98
B. Limitation of Liability
Even if the United States were to adopt the Convention rule, cargo
owners could argue that international uniformity with respect to colli-
sion liability would not result. 99 For when the non-carrying vessel
becomes a total or near total loss and the owner is entitled to limit his
liability, the recovery accorded to cargo owners in the United States
would still differ from that of other maritime nations. 100 Cargo owners
and their underwriters might be more amenable to adoption of the
Convention rule if they were guaranteed a fund from which cargo
damage claims could be partially satisfied. 101
The limitation of liability concept embodied in the Brussels Con-
vention of 1957102 assures the cargo owner of such a fund. This
Convention establishes a limitation fund of approximately 10 3 $67 for
each ton of the ship's total tonnage in cases involving only damage to
property. 10 When a collision results in property damage and personal
injury or death claims, the fund is fixed at $207 per ton. 105 The first $140
98. It should be noted that under the terms of the Draft Convention, a shipowner still
would be entitled to limit his liability to cargo claimants if he complied with the terms of the
limitation of liability statute. Kimball, supra note 94, at 240, 252. For a discussion of the
potential impact on marine insurance if the Draft Convention is adopted, see id. at 240-43.
99. Uniform Maritime Law, supra note 14, at 887.
100. See text accompanying notes 54-56, supra.
101. See Uniform Maritime Law, supra note 14, at 886-87.
102. International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of
Sea Going Ships, done Oct. 10, 1957, reprinted in BENEDICT ON ADMIRALITY, supra note
6, at 634 [hereinafter cited as Brussels Convention of 1957]. Although the United States is
not a party, the Convention has been ratified or followed by more than thirty nations. For a
list of those countries who have adopted the Convention, see id. at 635-36. For a
comprehensive discussion of the treaty provisions, see Comment, Limitation of Shipown-
er's Liability-The Brussels Convention at 1957, 68 YALE L.J. 1676 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as Shipowner's Liability].
103. The fund provisions of the Convention are expressed in Poincare gold francs.
Because of wide fluctuation in the free market value of gold and currency devaluations
during the past few years, the dollar equivalents of the funds can only be approximated.
See Asser, Golden Limitations of Liability in International Transport Conventions and
Currency Crisis, 5 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 645 (1974).
104. Brussels Convention of 1957, supra note 102, art. 3(l)(a) wherein the treaty
provides:
The amounts to which the owner of a ship may limit his liability under Article I
shall be: (a) Where the occurrence has only given rise to property claims, an
aggregate amount of 1000 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage.
105. Id. art. 3(l)(b) which states: "Where the occurrence has only given rise to
personal claims an aggregate amount of 3100 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage."
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is allocated to personal injury and death claims. The remaining $67 must
be divided ratably among property loss claims and personal injury and
death claimants whose claims are not satisfied by the $140 per ton
fund.106 Although the Brussels Convention of 1957 is considered a
"dead letter" 1 07 because it has not been ratified by a sufficient number
of maritime nations to give it operative effect, the limitation system it
introduced has been adopted by several leading maritime countries
through domestic legislation.
108
There are several benefits that would result from adoption of the
limitation system contained in the Brussels Convention of 1957.1°9
First, it guarantees a fund, even when the ship and cargo become a total
loss, enabling the cargo claimants to receive some measure of compen-
sation for their losses" l0 without exposing the shipowner to unreason-
able risks."' 1 Second, the limitation proceedings will be simplified,
thereby relieving the courts and parties of the monumental task of
determining the ships' value after the collision." 2 Thirdly, a fund
established by a tonnage formula would promote uniformity which
would alleviate a considerable amount of forum shopping."1
3
106. Id. art. 3(!)(c) which provides:
Where the occurrence has given rise both to personal claims and property
claims an aggregate amount of 3100 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage, of
which a first portion amounting to 2100 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage
shall be exclusively appropriated to the payment of personal claims and of
which a second portion amounting to 1000 francs for each ton of the ship's
tonnage shall be appropriated to the payment of property claims, provided
however that in cases where the first portion is insufficient to pay the personal
claims in full, the unpaid balance of such claims shall rank rateably with the
property claims for payment against the second portion of the fund. (footnote
omitted).
107. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 824 n.13j.
108. SUNDSTROM, supra note 9, at 90.
109. The Brussels Convention of 1957 does have two inherent weaknesses. First, it
results in an unfair recovery for cargo owners when the vessel's tonnage is low and the
value of cargo is high. 1963 Hearings, supra note 6, at 94 (statement of Leonard J.
Matteson). Second, in certain circumstances, the limitation fund of $207 per ton could
work to the distinct advantage of the owners of large ships. When a vessel is not
substantially injured as the result of a collision and its value exceeds $207 per ton, the
shipowner's liability would be less than under the method of computation used in the
United States. Id. at 145 (statement of Abraham E. Freeman).
110. See Uniform Maritime Law, supra note 14, at 888.
11I. The shipowner's risk of loss has been significantly reduced with the arrival of
limited liability of incorporation and marine insurance. Eyer, Shipowner's Limitation of
Liability---New Directions for an Old Doctrine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370, 389 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Eyer]. See Shipowner's Liability, supra note 102, at 1713.
112. 1962 Hearings, supra note 9, at 36. For a discussion of the problems encountered
in determining the value of a ship in limitation proceedings, see id. at 136-37; Shipowner's
Liability, supra note 102, at 1697.
113. It has been stated that the uniformity created by adoption of the Brussels
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IV. CONCLUSION
The elusive goal of international harmony in maritime collision law
has been brought a step closer by the United States' adoption of the
proportional fault rule in Reliable Transfer. This new standard,which
apportions damages between the negligent vessels on the basis of fault,
has eliminated an important factor involved in transoceanic forum
shopping. 114 However, when a collision involves cargo damage, strik-
ing discrepancies still exist.
These differences can be eliminated. The United States should
adopt the Convention rule, which holds negligent vessel owners sever-
ally but not jointly liable, and apply the doctrine of proportional fault to
recovery for damage to cargo. The uniformity created by adoption of the
Convention rule would eliminate the expense and hardship involved in
seeking a forum that will apply the most advantageous legal principle.
The Draft Convention, if adopted, provides an added incentive for
United States adherence to the Convention rule. With the elimination of
the defense of mere error in -navigation or management, the more
equitable remedy of apportioning damages between the shipowners and
cargo owners would be realized by holding each shipowner responsible
in proportion to his degree of fault.
Although adoption of the Convention rule would bring about a
substantial degree of uniformity in international maritime law, the
United States method of computing the shipowners' limitation of
liability continues to differ from the procedure used by the major
maritime states. Thus, as the final step in achieving international unity
in this area, the United States should adopt the tonnage formula
limitation concept provided in the Brussels Convention of 1957.115 The
Convention of 1957, standing by itself, "is sufficient to warrant support by the United
States." 1963 Hearings, supra note 6, at 60 (statement of Raymond Greene).
114. The problem of forum shopping influenced the Court's adoption of the propor-
tional fault rule when it stated: "Indeed, the United States is now virtually alone among
the world's major maritime nations in not adhering to the Convention with its rule of
proportional fault-a fact that encourages transoceanic forum shopping." United States
v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1975).
115. The uniformity created by a limitation concept based on a tonnage formula is a
desired goal among cargo owners and their underwriters. If, however, the United States
adopts the Convention rule and the Draft Convention replaces the presently existing
Hague Rules, then strong consideration should be given to abandoning the limitation of
liability concept. The completion of these three steps would result in a total proportional
liability system. Such a system would provide a fair distribution of loss among the
shipowners without infringing upon the cargo owners right to recover. For example, in a
collision involving $3 million in ship and cargo damages, a shipowner who is two-thirds at
fault would be liable for $2,000,000. The other vessel owner would be responsible for the
remaining $1,000,000. Cargo owners would be completely compensated for their losses.
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adoption of the Convention rule and the limitation theory embodied in
the Brussels Convention of 1957 will complete the voyage embarked on
by Reliable Transfer in conforming United States law with current
international standards where there is a mutual fault maritime collision
involving cargo damage.
Stuart Jay Yasgoor
Shipowners could reduce their exposure to unlimited liability by adjusting the freight rates
charged to their customers according to the value of cargo shipped. In addition, these rates
could be fixed to reflect the degree of risk involved in transporting different types of
cargoes. Thus, a more expensive cargo or a hazardous trip could be charged at a higher
rate.
It is recognized that unilateral action by the United States to abolish the shipowners'
right to limit liability might place United States interests at a competitive disadvantage in
international maritime commerce. See Shipowner's Liability, supra note 102, at 1713;
Eyer, supra note I 1l, at 390. However, it is hoped that the major maritime nations of the
world would follow the United States' initiative of promoting a more equitable and
efficient method of apportioning damages between the shipowners and the cargo owners.
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